



Treaty Times

April 2003

Volume III

Captain's Corner



Recent events in the news concerning Iraq and Russia's use of calmatives in the Moscow theater hostage rescue have focused lots of attention on weapons of mass destruction and compliance with international arms control obligations. Indeed, several newspaper articles have even tried to draw parallels between Iraq's obligations under a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions and the obligations of the United States under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These obligations are not the same. Nevertheless, amid all the discussion of Iraq's conduct and its violation of Security Council resolutions, there have been a number of allegations by individuals and non-governmental organizations that the U.S. has violated the CWC. The allegations have focused on concepts – generally related to chemically-based riot control agents such as malodorants or calmatives - that have been, are being, or might potentially be examined by the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) or U.S. government agencies other than the DoD. As a result of these news stories, the DoD CWC Compliance Review Group (CRG) reviewed the activities of the JNLWD and in December 2002 certified that it has not sponsored and

is not now sponsoring any activity that violates the CWC.

A CWC Review Conference is scheduled for April 2003. In preparation for that conference, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological matters (ATSD(NCB)) directed DoD Components to review all chemically-based activities. A data call was issued in January to affected Department of the Navy activities. The Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP) is reviewing all activities identified by the data call and coordinating the response to ATSD(NCB). A similar data call for biologically-based activities will follow the CWC review. NTIP has maintained a comprehensive compliance review program for some time, and, for it to be effective, NTIP needs the active cooperation of Navy commands involved in research and development, acquisition programs or operations that might be affected by U.S. arms control obligations. NTIP personnel will continue striving to minimize impacts on affected Navy commands and to support those commands by fielding questions and addressing their concerns regarding arms control treaties and agreements.

CAPT M. Maxfield

Riot Control Agents

One of the most often asked question about the CWC is "Am I allowed to have riot control agents at my base?"

As a party to the CWC, the United States has undertaken not to use Riot Control Agents (RCAs) as "a method of warfare." The CWC defines RCAs as chemicals that can produce sensory irritation or disabling physical effects in humans, which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. The CWC requires parties to declare the types of chemicals held for riot control purposes. The United States' declaration includes oleoresin capsicum (i.e.

cayenne pepper spray) and CS gas, both of which are in the Navy inventory of RCAs.

The United States uses RCAs for law enforcement purposes, and the CWC specifically recognizes "law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes" as a purpose not prohibited under the Convention. Naval facilities are allowed to have RCAs for law enforcement including riot control purposes.

Although the phrase "method of warfare" is not defined in the CWC, the United States has made clear its understanding of the restriction. On 8 April 1975, President Ford issued Executive Order 11850 that renounces first use of RCAs in war except in defensive military modes to save lives. Such defensive military

modes include use of RCAs: for riot control in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control such as against rioting POWs; to reduce or avoid civilian casualties where civilians are used to mask or screen an attack; in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas of downed aircrews or escaping prisoners; and in rear echelon areas to protect convoys from civil disturbances, paramilitary organizations, or terrorists. E.O. 11850 requires prior Presidential approval for the use of RCAs in war.

The CWC Resolution of Ratification adopted by the Senate specifically required that the President certify that RCAs may be used in peacekeeping operations and that the President not alter the RCA usage provisions promulgated in E.O. 11850. On 25 April 1997, President Clinton certified to the Congress that the United States is not restricted in its use of RCAs in "various peacetime and peacekeeping operations."

CJCS Instruction 3110.07B provides further guidance on the use of RCAs, both in war and in situations other than war. Generally speaking, the President must provide prior authorization to use RCAs in a war zone and the Secretary of Defense has retained the responsibility to authorize the use of RCAs during peacetime except in certain specific, limited situations. Restrictions on the use of RCAs during peacetime operations are addressed in the rules of engagement for the particular operation. These rules have been carefully reviewed to ensure they comply with the CWC requirements. If you are involved in a military operation, you need to ensure that you adhere to the existing rules of engagement.

The NTIP CWC Treaty Manager and staff are prepared to answer any questions you might have. If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Treaty on Open Skies

SECNAVINST 5710.26 has been signed!



It's official! The Open Skies SECNAVINST 5710.26 was signed on 4 March 2003. If you are interested in a copy go to: www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty/.

Here's a question for our loyal readers. What is the temperature inside the US Open Skies OC-135, flying over Siberia in December, when the heater is broken and the temperature on the ground is -25F?

Answer: We don't know either, but even polar bears don't like it that cold. At least, they didn't have to serve ice in the drinks. The US Open Skies aircraft, after

canceling one mission and postponing another, flew its first treaty mission over Russia, which occurred 4-15 December. The flight was made at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the results were three rolls of film and several Air Forceccicles. Since no crewmember lost any toes or fingers, the mission was considered a success. The OS aircraft had a few minor maintenance problems, but the US Team Chief was able to work around them (read parkas, gloves, wool socks, and hot chocolate).

The US used the entire 8-hour period to negotiate the flight plan, a simple out and back from Ulan-Ude. The flight path came near the Chinese-Russian border, but stayed out of Chinese airspace, rumor has it the pilot had a picture of a broken P-3 taped to the instrument panel as a reminder. The Russians were very cooperative throughout the entire mission, one in a row. The US anticipates that Russia will conduct a treaty mission over the U.S. in 3rd quarter CY 2003.

The Treaty on Open Skies has been in force for one year now, and the Russians have been busy. Russia has been conducting treaty missions since August 2002. They have overflown: United Kingdom (2), Benelux, Germany (2), Turkey (2), Norway, Italy, Greece and France. Ukraine has conducted three treaty observation missions over Hungary, Poland, and Turkey.

Since the Treaty has entered-into-force the following countries have applied for accession: Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Lithuania and Cyprus. Sweden, Finland and Latvia have acceded and are currently members. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Lithuania have been approved for accession but have not yet acceded, and Cyprus has applied but not yet been approved.

Congratulations to the Top Ten Responders for the January Blue-on-Blue General Alert message, reference number: 241530Z Jan 03

1. FACSFAC Jacksonville
2. COMANVSPECWARDEVGRU Dam Neck
3. SUBRON SUPPU Norfolk
4. COMSUBRON EIGHT
5. NAVAIRWPNSTA China Lake
6. COMNAVAIRWARCENWPNDIV China Lake
7. NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV Keyport
8. COMLANFTLT Norfolk
9. CGII MEF
10. CG MCB Camp Lejeune

If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

What about a CWC Challenge Inspection at a Strategic Weapon Nuclear Facility?

Planning for such an eventuality has been ongoing. Difficult questions exist. Of particular concern is whether the facility's obligation to the United States Government's policy to "neither confirm, nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons could be reconciled with the highly intrusive nature of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Challenge Inspection.

On January 15-17, 2003, Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic and NTIP conducted an interactive tabletop exercise designed to work through this situation. NTIP provided the CWC scenario and role played various elements external to the facility that would be involved in the inspection. Base representatives responded, providing particularly valuable experiences related to ongoing obligations to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) inspections.



CWC Tabletop Exercise Participants

A similar exercise, is being planned at Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific.

The NTIP CWC Treaty Manager and staff are prepared to answer any questions you might have. If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Impact of a START Data Update Inspection on a Strategic Weapons Facility

Of the nine Navy facilities which are normally subject to inspection under the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the facilities most impacted are the Strategic Weapons Facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia and Silverdale, Washington (SWFLANT and SWFPAC). SWFLANT and SWFPAC are both subject to two different types of inspection-- the Data Update Inspection (DUI) and the Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RV OSI). Additionally, although other Navy facilities are subject to DUI, the Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWFs) both have the most structures to inspect and the most items requiring accounting and measuring. The SWFs have hosted 40 of the 70 START inspections held to date at Navy facilities.

Under the START Treaty quotas, a facility may be subject to a maximum of two DUI per year. The Inspection can last no more than 24 hours, with the possibility of an additional 8-hour extension if both the inspectors and the inspected party agree. However, the impact on a SWF extends well beyond that potential 32-hour period. Both SWFs have spent untold hours preparing to conduct inspections and they continue to conduct training on a regular basis to maintain their proficiency.

Before a START inspection team can arrive in the U.S., they must provide notification a minimum of 16 hours before they are due to arrive at either the East Coast (Dulles) or West Coast (San Francisco) Point of Entry (POE). When this notification is received in Washington, D.C., DoD provides a notification to all of the facilities subject to inspection which can be accessed through that POE. The SWFs follow approved checklists to prepare for potential inspection. Tasks include such things as reviewing available manpower, notification of the key personnel, and evaluating upcoming activities to determine if events should be cancelled or rescheduled. Due to Russian flight schedules, inspection teams often arrive and start their period of inspections on a weekend (and holidays are not immune), so personnel availability can be a significant issue and preparation can have a major impact on people's plans.

When the incoming START inspection team declares a time of arrival, they also announce when they will declare the site selected for the first inspection. This occurs between 4 and 24 hours after the team's arrival at the POE. Thus, the SWF is presented with the uncertainty of how much to prepare during the 20-40 hours between the announcement that a team is coming

to the U.S. and the announcement of the specific facility to be inspected.

Once the specific site is selected, there is very little time to prepare before the arrival of the team. START requires that national escorts provided by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) deliver the inspectors to the selected facility no later than 9 hours after the site selection is announced. Further, the selected facility is required to implement certain movement restrictions no later than one hour after the site selection. These "pre-inspection restrictions" require that no object large enough to be, or to contain, a Treaty Item of Inspection (IOI) depart the facility boundaries. For the SWFs, an IOI is the first stage of a Trident I missile. Therefore, within that one hour period, instructions have to be issued to facility access gates to restrict movement and any large vehicles within the boundaries have a very short time to depart the SWF or risk being "trapped", possibly for the duration of an inspection. Delivery trucks and construction trailers could be impacted, which could lead to increased costs.

Additionally, all persons need to be recalled and/or notified of the inspection. Escorts and drivers with assigned inspection duties will be working for the next 30-40 hours. They need to report for their shift and begin inspection preparations. Some operations may be moved or shrouded to avoid revealing sensitive data. SWF personnel coordinate with supporting organizations, such as base transportation, medical staff, security forces, local dining facility, supply, photo lab, public affairs, and Base/Squadron Headquarters. Briefing rooms and work rooms are prepared. Briefing materials are reviewed and updated. An information packet with current information is prepared for each inspector and DTRA escort and placed at their places at the briefing table. Vehicles to pick up the inspectors and DTRA at the airport and to move up to five inspection subgroups around the SWF are prepared, including a security sweep and escort by the Marines security force. Radios to permit coordination among the subgroups and the operations control (OPCON) center are tested, batteries recharged and distributed to drivers and escorts. During the inspection period, the OPCON is continuously staffed to provide positive control of preparations of buildings, tracking of the inspector subgroups and reporting completion of inspection activities.

All buildings subject to inspection are prepared by the individual building managers, to include shrouding of sensitive items, marking of inspection routes and general cleaning of the areas. Each building manager has a detailed checklist specific to his/her building which lists all of the preparatory measures required. All of the storage and handling containers for IOIs at the SWF will be prepared for inspection.

With at least a 24-hour operation awaiting the SWF, provisions for rotation of shifts for personnel have to be made. Some inspection teams work around the clock (so lights may have to be obtained to support night operations), while some take a short break at night and resume the next day. Although an inspection can be long and taxing, the Treaty provisions do not require the facility to violate any existing safety and security requirements.

When the preparation time is nearly complete, SWF escorts meet the inspectors and DTRA escorts at a local airport and escort them to the facility, briefing them on the inspection procedures while on the bus. When the team arrives at the SWF, they are taken to the briefing room and a formal in-briefing, which the Treaty limits to a maximum of one hour, is presented. The inspectors and DTRA escorts are provided working areas and the inspectors are provided an opportunity to call their embassy, if required. Then, it is time to begin the inspection.

The inspectable area includes most of the missile production area and all of the missile and missile motor/stage storage area, including some 65-75 storage magazines. Inspection of the magazines requires multiple crews to open and secure the magazines, as well as Marine security forces. The inspection team may select one or more missiles and/or first stage motors to measure. This involves the work of a specially-trained measurement team to remove container hatches and properly place measurement devices. These activities consume much of the allotted inspection time.

The inspection proceeds with escorts leading the teams through each building, with drivers shuttling teams to the next area, or to a lunch break, or, more important for some inspectors, a smoke break. The OPCON maintains constant contact with, and track of, the teams. The medical team stands by in case an inspector, or worker, is injured. The cafeteria stands by to feed the inspectors, DTRA, and local workers. If need be, take-out food can be delivered to the inspectors and/or workers while they continue their activities. Once a building is inspected and released, work may resume in that building, but, with so much manpower consumed by the inspection, normal operations are basically put off for a day.

After the 24 hours, or when all buildings have been inspected, whichever comes first, the inspectors are returned to their work area to write their inspection report. Their comments, and the U.S. response, must both be translated. The report preparation can take up to, but no more than, an additional four hours. After the report is finished, the inspectors, DTRA and local escorts meet with the SWF Commanding Officer for a formal out-briefing and closing ceremony. Here, the

report is signed and closing protocol formalities are concluded.

Even after the inspectors and DTRA escorts have left the Base on their bus, the impact of the DUI on the SWF is not over. Many escorts and drivers have been working long hours over the last day-and-a-half and need rest. But, inspection shrouding materials need to be removed. Inspectable buildings, storage containers and areas have to be put back into their pre-inspection conditions. Procedures and checklists need to be evaluated to find a better way to operate on future OSI. Training for escorts and drivers needs to be refined and refresher training given. Being ready for the next inspection starts right after the last inspection. Once a year, the START personnel from the SWFs meet with SSP START Treaty experts and their counterparts from all other Navy sites subject to START inspection to compare and refine procedures. Continued readiness is needed to ensure continued Treaty compliance.

Any individual or organization with a question or concern regarding Navy START requirements may call (202) 764-1555 or e-mail sp2023@sphq.ssp.navy.mil.

The Legal Corner

Treaties: The Language of Nations A Short Tutorial

"The fidelity of the United States to security treaties is not just an empty matter. It is a pillar of peace in the world." -- David Dean Rusk



In a previous edition, I discussed the different types of international agreements and the factors that are considered in determining what form an international agreement might take. To recap, International agreements are any agreements where two or more states commit themselves to create legal rights and obligations with respect to each other that are governed by well-established international legal practice and principles. Such agreements give rise to certain remedies either authorized by the agreement itself or treaty law. Treaties are generally considered the "highest form" of international agreements.

There are many types of international agreements. But those whose entry into force takes place only after the Senate has given its advice and consent are called "treaties." The President is expressly authorized to make treaties under Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution. That power, however, is conditioned on seeking and receiving the "Advice and Consent of the Senate." Properly speaking, the Senate does not ratify a treaty; the Senate gives its consent to ratification. The President makes, ratifies, or accedes to a treaty on behalf of the United States. The Senate cannot amend a

treaty or enter reservations to it. It can, however, give its consent to a treaty on condition that it be modified, or, in the case of a multilateral agreement, that the United States enter one or more reservations (exceptions) to the agreement.



CFE Treaty Signing

The Senate often gives its consent subject to conditions. Sometimes the Senate consents only on the basis of a particular understanding of the meaning of the treaty, or on condition that the United States

obtain a modification of its terms or enter a reservation to it. The Senate may also give its consent on conditions that do not require change in the treaty but relate to its domestic application; for example, that the treaty shall not be "self-executing," or that future agreements made in implementation of the treaty shall require the further approval of the Senate. Of course, the President need not fulfill those conditions, but he cannot agree to the treaty unless they are met. And ultimately, the President may decide not to make the treaty after the Senate has approved it even if it did so without condition or reservation.

Now, I've used a number of terms here that might be confusing and thus require further explanation. Additionally, there are other terms and phrases of "treaty law" which you may encounter and whose meaning you may not fully understand or appreciate. So here's a short treaty lexicon for your consideration.

a. Signature. A state can be bound upon signature, but that is extremely unusual with regard to treaties. Under U.S. law the United States cannot be bound to a treaty unless it has received the advice and consent of the Senate. Signature is normally *ad referendum*, i.e., subject to later ratification, and has no binding effect but is deemed to represent political approval and at least a moral obligation to seek ratification.

b. Ratification. "Ratification" describes the approval process usually involving legislative input culminating in the signature by a head of state or his/her representative and the deposit of a document expressing consent to be bound. For the United States a condition precedent to ratification is having the "advice and consent" of the Senate.

c. Accession. "Accession" refers to the action of a state in expressing its consent to be bound by an agreement drafted by other states through a procedure in which the acceding state did not participate. The method of adherence used must be one permitted by the agreement, expressly or by implication. For the United

States, the President may accede to a treaty but, again, only after first receiving Senate advice and consent.

d. Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Agreements. Generally the intention of the United States determines whether an agreement will be self-executing or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or administrative action. After the agreement is concluded, often the President will decide whether the agreement is self-executing; that is, whether existing law is adequate for the United States to carry out its obligation, or require further legislation. Congress may also consider whether new legislation is necessary and, if so, what it should provide. Further, some provisions of a treaty may be self-executing and others non-self-executing. If it is non-self-executing then we are under an international legal obligation to adjust our laws, as appropriate, to give the treaty full force and effect. I know this is a little confusing. And it gets worse! For example, a treaty cannot take effect as domestic law without implementation by Congress if the agreement's terms cover the exclusive Constitutional law-making power of Congress. For example, a treaty providing for the payment of money will require an appropriation of funds by Congress in order to effect the payment required by the agreement. Likewise, treaties requiring states parties to punish certain actions could not itself become part of the criminal law of the U.S. without first Congress passing an appropriate statute. For example, the United States ratified the Biological Warfare Convention in 1975, which required states to pass criminal legislation. The U.S. did not get around to passing implementing legislation until 1989. Consequently, domestic biological warfare (terrorism) was not prohibited under the BWC for the U.S. until 1989 even though we'd ratified the treaty 14 years earlier (other statutes, however, did make the result of such acts a crime).

e. Entry-Into-Force(EIF). For a bi-lateral agreement EIF occurs when both states have ratified the treaty and exchanged "instruments" (documents) of ratification. A multilateral treaty enters into force when all negotiating states have agreed to be bound or when a lesser number stipulated in the agreement have so agreed. So, a state may have ratified the treaty but it is not legally bound until the treaty enters into force per the stated requirements of the treaty. For example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not enter into force until 44 specific states have ratified. So, even though as of last count 98 states have ratified, only 31 of the needed 44 have done so.

The language used in treaties and other international agreements usually has a precise legal meaning and effect. If you have any questions about the meaning of words or phrases in any of the multitude of arms control agreements with the potential to affect your mission

please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Arms Control Treaty Compliance

The last few months have seen significant progress in the Arms Control Treaty Compliance Assessment Program (CAP).

In January 2003, NTIP met with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to discuss arms control treaty compliance of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD). An ACTD is a demonstration program which evaluates technology and operational concepts to support a military user. NTIP looks forward to working within the ONR process to ensure arms control treaty compliance of ACTDs.

Arms control treaties can potentially impact mission force structure, deployments, operations and budgets, and place limitations on research, development, testing and exercises. NTIP is working to develop an effective means of identifying current and future activities to ensure arms control treaty compliance while minimizing impacts on Navy and Marine Corps operations and exercises critical to the warfighting mission.

NTIP arms control treaty compliance assessments of Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs are ongoing thanks to the cooperation of Navy and Marine Corps Systems Command (SYSCOM) acquisition professionals, the N810 Requirements Generation process, and informed Program Managers who are aware of their requirement to comply with DOD and Navy guidance to ensure that acquisition and procurement of weapons and weapon systems are consistent with applicable domestic law and arms control treaties and agreements. Since the last issue of the Treaty Times, the following DON acquisition programs have completed arms control treaty compliance assessments:

N810 REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROGRAMS:

US EXPORT SYSTEM MODERNIZATION
(USXPORTS)

GLOBAL COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM (GCSS)
ADVANCED AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES (AFSOF)

AIR MOBILITY PLATFORM
STRATEGIC WAR PLANNING SYSTEM (SWPS)
MODULAR CROWD CONTROL MUNITION
(MCCM)

MARINE FOR LIFE

DEFENSE INTEGRATED MILITARY HUMAN
RESOURCES SYSTEM (DIMHRS)

PRECISION TARGETING WORKSTATION

U.S. NUCLEAR DETONATION (NUDET)
DETECTION SYSTEM (USNDS)

HIGH MOBILITY ARTILLERY ROCKET SYSTEM (HIMARS)
 RANGE INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS
MARINE CORPS SYSTEM COMMAND PROGRAMS BY DIRECTORATE:
 AAS PREDATOR SHORT RANGE ASSAULT WEAPON (SRAW)
 ADWS FALSE TARGET LOCATION MODIFICATION (FTLM)
 CESS MILITARY EYE PROTECTION SYSTEM
 CMD OPS CTR UNIT OPERATIONS CENTER (UOC)
 COMM TRANSITION SWITCH MODULE
 CSIS JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS GENERATOR II
 CSIS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM (PES)
 FSS TARGET LOCATION, DESIGNATION, AND HAND-OFF SYSTEM
 FSS MODULAR ARTILLERY CHARGE SYSTEM
 FSS MORTAR BALLISTIC COMPUTER
 FSS AN/GVS-5 REPLACEMENT
 ICE INFANTRY RADIO HEADGEAR SET (IRHS)
 ICE BREACHING KIT (BK)
 ICE IMPROVED BAYONET (MPB)
 ICE IMPROVED HIKING SOCK
 ICE FIELD TARP
 INTEL TEAM PORTABLE COLLECTION SYSTEM MULTI-PLATFORM
 INTEL MOBILE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT SYSTEM - PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
 INTEL RADIO RECONNAISSANCE EQUIPMENT PROGRAM
 IW CLEAR-A-SPACE CAPABILITY (CASC)
 IW MOBILITY DENIAL SYSTEM
 IW PORTABLE VEHICLE ARRESTING BARRIER
 IW NON-LETHAL 40MM CROWD DISPERSING ROUND
 LW155 LIGHTWEIGHT 155MM TOWED HOWITZER
 MAR/NBC M-249 SPARE BARREL BAG
 MAR/NBC LIGHTWEIGHT HELMET
 MAR/NBC/SEA05P10 NBC JOINT WARNING AND REPORTING NETWORK (JWARN)
 NBCD JOINT SERVICE AIRCREW MASK (JSAM)
 NBCD DIGITAL RADIOGRAPHY (DR)

NON-LETHAL WPNS CLEAR FACILITIES
 OC COMPOSITE TRACKING NETWORK (CTN)

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND PROGRAMS:

PMA234 EA-6B ALQ-99 LOW BAND TRANSMITTER
 PMA272 AAR-47/AVR-2 MISSILE/LASER WARNING SYSTEM
 PMS350 SSN-21/BSY-2 SEAWOLF CLASS NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE
 PMS377 LHD 1 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP
 PMS426 COBRA JUDY REPLACEMENT
 RS MULTI-ROLE RADAR SYSTEM
 SBT-13 INTERIM SMALL UNIT REMOTE SCOUTING SYSTEMS (ISURSS)
 SEA 05P7 JOINT SERVICE SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION (JSSED) Blk II
 SYSTEMS TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

For additional information on Arms Control Treaty Compliance assessments consult our website (www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty/) or you may contact our Compliance Acquisition Program at NTIP_treaty@ssp.navy.mil or telephone 202-764-0910 (DSN 764). Please remember that NTIP is fully resourced, staffed, and mandated to assist all Navy and Marine Corps Program Managers.

2003 DON TIA and GEMI Submissions

Transparency in Armaments (TIA) and Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) are global Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) under which state parties annually submit aggregate data on major weapon and equipment systems, missiles, and personnel in their conventional armed forces to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The major weapon and equipment systems are further broken down into 9 sub-categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, armored vehicle launched bridges, anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armored vehicles, self-propelled and towed artillery, aircraft, helicopters, surface warships, and submarines. Personnel are reported for actual personnel on-board and authorized billets. This data is required to reflect the geographical positioning of personnel and equipment as of 31 December. This information depicts equipment holdings and personnel on the state parties territory, as well as 5 international regions.

The Services submit data to the Joint Staff (J5) who consolidates and validates service data, organization information and required technical information/photographs. Input is then submitted to OSD Deputy Director (Office of Treaty Compliance (OTC)), and upon review, the Deputy Director (OTC) provides the information to OSD(Policy) for release by the State Department to the OSCE by April 30.

The Navy Process

NTIP consolidates Navy and Marine Corps data for the annual TIA and GEMI exchanges. Data is provided to NTIP from various departments in the Navy and the Marine Corps. Year-to-year data submissions are analyzed and justified to ensure accuracy and consistency.

NTIP participates in the annual TIA/GEMI data exchange workshop with OSD, JS, and the Services during the first week in April, at which time U.S. data is reviewed and validated. The final Navy 2003 TIA/GEMI submission (CY 2002 data) will be made by NTIP on 20 April.

If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Fleet Liaison



Open Skies Training.

We have been busy conducting Open Skies training seminars. We are currently developing a training schedule for the next few months; so if you are interested in an Open Skies Training seminar, please

contact our office.

If you are an Open Skies Treaty Point of Contact, please let us know if your information has changed or changes in the near future. In order to notify you of an Open Skies treaty overflight, our notification database must be current.

We are offering training for all personnel impacted by the Treaty including those responsible for responding to Open Skies overflight notifications and those who make command impact assessments. Training can be provided to all hands including command duty officers, operations officers, range officers, program managers, and security personnel. There are also Train-the-Trainer sessions designed to provide the command with the in-house expertise to maintain Treaty awareness and train new personnel. Open Skies training can be brought to you in person or via video teleconferencing. Questions regarding Open Skies training should be directed to 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Arms Control Seminars. All Navy and Marine Corps commands can benefit from an understanding of how arms control treaties and agreements may affect them.

Each commander is responsible for compliance with all arms control treaties for his/her activity. NTIP is here to assist local commands in doing this. Arms Control Seminars are now being scheduled for 2003. These seminars are at no cost to your facility and can be planned at your convenience. If you are interested in obtaining information about or scheduling a treaty awareness seminar for your command or region, please contact 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Further Reading



United States: Rumsfeld Says Pentagon Wants Use of Nonlethal Gas

www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/2/6/11s.html

While senior Pentagon officials are fashioning rules of engagement that will allow the U.S. military to use nonlethal agents if the United States attacks Iraq, the effort has been made "very complex" by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention.

South Korea Believes North Has No Nukes

news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=516&ncid=731&e=1&u=/ap/20030210/ap_on_re_as/koreas_nuclear

In sharp differences with Washington, South Korea said North Korea does not have nuclear weapons and the United States should open direct talks with Pyongyang on the crisis.

Three in British Court Over Chemical Weapons

reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=2173086

Three north African men, accused of conspiring to make chemical weapons, have been charged under Britain's Terrorism Act with having in their possession "articles in circumstances which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that their possession was for a purpose connected with the commission, instigation or preparation of an act of terrorism."

Websites



The appearance of hyperlinks in this newsletter does not constitute endorsement by the Department of the Navy (DON) of the web sites or the information, products or services contained therein and DON does not exercise any editorial control over the information you may find at these locations.

Center for the Study of Bioterrorism

www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/

Center for Non-Proliferation Studies

cns.miis.edu/index.htm

Global Security.org

www.globalsecurity.org/

The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

foreign.senate.gov/

Nuclear Threat Initiative

www.nti.org/

RCA– Riot Control Agent

Acronym List

TIA – Transparency in Armaments

GEMI - Global Exchange of Military Information

ACTD - Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations

SWF – Strategic Weapons Facility

E-mail Addresses



In order to e-mail you and your command this newsletter and other pertinent information regarding treaty compliance and implementation, please e-mail our office with the following information:

- Command Name
- Official Command E-mail Address
- Commanding Officer Name
- Commanding Officer Phone Number
- Treaty Point-of-Contact (POC) Name
- POC Official Business E-mail Address
- POC Phone Number

You can also contact us at 301-744-4206, e-mail

TSOTreaty@ih.navy.mil.

Feedback



How are we doing? Is there something you would like to see in the next issue? We appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have. Please address all questions,

comments, or concerns to:

E-Mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil

Phone: 202-764-0910

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Fax: 202-764-0918

Name and Address

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Command	Strategic Systems Programs
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